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Compensation of regional 
unemployment in housing markets 
 
 
Abstract: Why are regional unemployment differentials in Europe so persistent if, as the 
wage curve literature demonstrates, there is no compensation in labour markets? We 
hypothesize that workers in high-unemployment regions are compensated in housing markets. 
Modelling regional unemployment differentials as a consequence of centralized wage 
bargaining, we show that clearing of land markets may undo the incentive for workers to 
migrate to low-unemployment regions in general equilibrium. The compensating differentials 
hypothesis is tested on city-level data for several countries. Controlling for variation in 
income and amenities, housing is found to be about 3 percent less expensive on average in 
cities where unemployment is 10 percent up. An analysis of housing demand survey data, 
which takes account of housing heterogeneity, yields a similar negative relationship. The 
magnitude of the income effect generated by this compensating differential is consistent with a 
-0.10 wage curve elasticity. These findings weaken the case for regional support programs. 
 
Keywords: regional unemployment, housing markets, wage curve, compensating 
differentials, hedonic models, regional policy 
 
Classification-JEL: R23, R13, J64 
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1 Introduction 
 
The puzzle that inspired our research is the coexistence of a wage curve and persistent 
regional unemployment differentials.  Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) present evidence of a 
wage curve for a variety of countries and time periods, consistently finding wages to be 1 
percent lower in regions where unemployment is 10 percent up (cf. Groot et al., 1992, Card, 
1995, Baltagi and Blien, 1998). Their analysis contradicts a long-held belief that wages 
compensate for regional unemployment differentials, which originates from Harris and 
Todaro (1970) and Hall (1970, 1972). If workers in high-unemployment regions earn lower 
wages, one would expect regional differences in unemployment to disappear through labour 
migration in a relatively short period of time. However, it is well established that regional 
unemployment differentials may be large and very persistent, predominantly in European 
countries (cf. OECD, 2000, 2005, Overman and Puga, 2002). 
 Persistence of regional unemployment differentials is usually explained with barriers 
to interregional migration, possibly related to housing market institutions (cf. OECD, 2005).1 
However, if regional unemployment differentials persist for a longer period, say 10 to 20 
years, costly adjustment alone does not seem to be a satisfactory explanation.2 An alternative 
view is that these regional differences in unemployment reflect an equilibrium outcome. 
Workers should then enjoy the same utility in each region, being compensated in other 
markets for high regional unemployment rates. This second line of reasoning, the existence of 
compensating differentials, will be pursued in the present paper.  
 Although compensating differentials may operate through any consumption good a 
priori, the two most obvious channels are amenities and housing markets. For the United 
States, empirical evidence seems to support the hypothesis that workers accept less favourable 
labour market conditions if a region offers consumer amenities such as an agreeable climate 
(cf. Roback, 1982, Marston, 1985, Blomquist et al., 1988, Gyourko and Tracy, 1989, 1991).3 
One may wonder however, what amenity could explain the large regional differences in 
unemployment, observed in for example Germany or the United Kingdom, which seem 
relatively homogeneous in terms of climate and natural scenery. More fundamentally, as 
                                                 
1
 The relationship between housing market institutions and migration has been investigated amongst others by 
Minford et al. (1987) and Hughes and McCormick (1987), who point to the lack of private sector rental units as a 
major factor. A related issue that has received considerable attention in the literature is the Oswald hypothesis, 
which states that owner occupancy raises aggregate unemployment because it hampers labour mobility (Oswald, 
1999).  
2
 For one reason, trade and mobility of capital may be expected to equilibrate regional labour market disparities 
over such a long period, even if labour is completely immobile.  
 4 
pointed out by Roback (1982), consumer amenities are capitalized in labour markets only to 
the extent that producers compete with consumers for land. Otherwise, they are capitalized in 
land markets. Therefore, it seems implausible that regional unemployment differentials within 
European countries are fully compensated by amenities. Carlson (2000) is the only study we 
are aware of that tests the amenity model on European data (for Norway), and he rejects it. 
The alternative hypothesis that workers are compensated in land (housing) markets has 
received less attention in the literature so far.4 This is all the more surprising, because in many 
countries, the observation that houses are less expensive in high-unemployment regions seems 
almost evident.  
 Although we believe that compensation in housing markets may occur in several 
institutional settings, we will present here a stylized core-periphery model with centralized 
wage bargaining. In many continental European countries, centralized wage bargaining covers 
more than 80 percent of employees (OECD, 2004), so it seems a natural starting point for 
explaining regional unemployment.5 In our model, this labour market distortion hampers 
adjustment of wages to lower labour productivity levels in the periphery, which results in 
unemployment. We demonstrate that in general equilibrium, workers in the periphery are 
compensated by lower house prices. 
Compensation in housing markets may be relevant not only in equilibrium, but also in 
the adjustment process towards equilibrium. Durability and inelastic supply of housing, 
possibly related to growth controls or other spatial policies, imply a strong relationship 
between prices and labour market shocks (cf. Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005, Glaeser et al., 
                                                                                                                                                        
3
 Most of these papers consider compensation for wage differentials, rather than unemployment.  
4
 Compensation in housing markets has received some attention in the urban economics literature. For example, 
Zenou and Smith (1995) and Brueckner and Zenou (1999) present urban efficiency wage models, in which there 
is a trade off between local unemployment and house prices. Smith and Zenou (2003) present a model with 
compensation in housing markets where the labour market imperfection is mismatch rather than costly 
monitoring. At the level of regions, the existence of compensating differentials is indicated indirectly by the 
limited sensitivity of aggregate migration to regional wage and unemployment differentials, found in numerous 
studies (cf. OECD, 2000, 2005). Analyses that include regional house prices tend to find that they affect 
migration patterns significantly (cf. Jackman and Savouri, 1992, Cameron and Muellbauer, 1998). These results 
are consistent with the view that lower house prices compensate workers for less favourable regional labour 
market perspectives. Finally, we refer to two papers that evaluate the impact of regional house prices on earnings 
and unemployment in the UK (Blackaby and Manning, 1992, and Cameron and Muellbauer, 2001). These 
studies find upward effects of house prices on earnings, which is consistent with compensation of wages in 
housing markets. Cameron and Muellbauer (2001) also find an upward effect of house prices on unemployment, 
which they interpret as an (exogenous) cost-of-location effect. Modelling earnings and unemployment, these 
studies do not provide direct evidence of compensation in housing markets. 
5
 However, there have been hardly any attempts to analyse these consequences in a formal economic model. An 
exception is Faini (1999), who relates unionization of unskilled workers to depressed growth in backward 
regions. The author provides two interesting cases that highlight the impact of centralized wage bargaining. He 
relates the surge in unemployment in East Germany in the period 1990 - 1992 to a decrease in wage inequality 
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2005). For example, as migrants move away from regions experiencing adverse demand 
shocks, house prices may increase in low unemployment regions (inelastic short-run supply) 
and decrease in high unemployment regions (durability). The resulting compensating 
differential may be larger than capitalization in land markets can account for.  
The empirical evidence presented in this paper is based on two types of data. 
Information on labour and housing market conditions at the city level is derived from the 
Urban Audit (European Commission, 2004). Negative bivariate relationships between average 
house prices per square meter and unemployment rates are established for all 9 European 
countries in our sample. Elasticities in a range from -0.4 to -0.6 cannot be rejected at the 10 
percent level of significance for any country. Controlling for income and amenity 
differentials, an elasticity to unemployment of about -0.3 is found.  
Estimates based on the city-level data may overstate the compensating differential, if 
households in low-unemployment cities occupy houses that are of a higher quality, or 
understate it, if these houses are smaller on average.6 These objections are examined in an 
analysis that employs housing demand survey data for the Netherlands. We obtain regional 
land rent differentials by regressing house prices on characteristics and region dummies. For 
both house prices and land rents, a negative elasticity is found in the same order of magnitude 
as indicated by the European data.  
We embed the compensating differentials hypothesis in a theoretical framework in the 
next two sections. The general equilibrium model with centralized wage bargaining will be 
presented in Section 2, whereas the role of housing markets in regional adjustment processes 
is the subject of section 3. Section 4 contains our empirical analyses, both of city-level and 
micro data. In concluding the paper, Section 5 interprets the magnitude of the compensating 
differential implied. Furthermore, we discuss a number of policy implications here. The most 
fundamental one probably is that evidence of compensation weakens the case for regional 
support programs, of which there is an abundance in the European Union and many of its 
member states nowadays.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
and he notes that unemployment in the Italian Mezzogiorno region rose rapidly after the 1968 push for wage 
equalization. Overman and Puga (2002) also provide a stylized model with regional wage rigidities.  
6
 The housing markets literature stresses that (extreme) heterogeneity is a fundamental property of housing as a 
consumption good (Smith et al., 1988).  
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2 An equilibrium relationship between unemployment and house prices 
 
In a long-run equilibrium, land prices are likely to be the main determinant of regional house 
price differentials. Hence, we model regional land markets rather than housing markets in this 
section. The essential property of land that generates compensating differentials is that it is 
neither tradable nor producible. Intuitively, land prices are higher in regions with attractive 
labour market conditions, because more workers want to live there, and supply is fixed.7 We 
formalize this intuition in a general equilibrium model in which the labour market is 
characterized by centralized wage bargaining.8 Wage setting in this model is dominated by the 
economic conditions in the core region, in which labour is more productive than in the 
periphery. Unemployment in peripheral regions results because wages, set at the national 
level, exceed the marginal productivity of labour. In equilibrium, clearing of land markets 
undoes the incentive for workers to move to the core.  
  
Regional land markets 
The regional supply of land is assumed to be fixed in our model. Hence, a market clearing 
rent can be derived by solving the consumer problem, under the additional assumption that 
firms do not use land as a production factor. Suppose that all workers are homogeneous, 
consuming land S and a composite good X. Given a Cobb-Douglas functional form, the utility 
equals ( ) ββ −= 1, iiii XSSXU , where subscript i denotes the region. Dependent on the workers’ 
employment status, her income Ii equals the regional wage wi or unemployment benefits b 
(with b < wi).9 It is assumed that the composite good is traded on world markets, and its price 
is normalized to unity. The land rent ri faced by a worker is specific to the region of residence. 
Solving the utility maximization problem, the worker consumes (1 – β)Ii units of X and βIi/ri 
units of land.  
 For simplicity, we assume that each region has the same endowment of land, which is 
normalized to unity. Let Pi denote the regional population. Furthermore, ui is the 
                                                 
7
 A positive relationship between the size of the regional workforce and land prices may work through a more 
subtle channel than fixed supply of land. Suppose that in each region, workers live in a city and provide labour in 
the local Central Business District. It is well established in the urban economics literature that the costs of living 
in a city increase with city size, either through commuting costs or land prices (cf. Fujita, 1989). Therefore, as 
more workers move to the core city to earn higher wages, the costs of living increase. In equilibrium, wage 
differentials are fully compensated by the sum of house prices and commuting costs in such a model. 
8
 Alternatively, we could have chosen labour market frictions or efficiency wages as a source of regional 
unemployment differentials, to arrive at similar results. For example, Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) present a 
regional efficiency wage model that can be easily extended with land markets.  
9
 The worker is assumed to consume land and supply labour in the same region, so there is no commuting.  
 7 
(endogenous) regional unemployment rate. Clearing of land markets implies the following 
equilibrium rent: 
 
( )[ ]iiiii wubuPr −+= 1β          (1) 
 
The rent equation (1) illustrates an important mechanism. In the first place, incomes are partly 
capitalized in land markets, and secondly, rents increase with the regional population. 
Therefore, rents decrease with the regional unemployment rate, because the average income is 
lower in a high-unemployment region, and because such a region will attract less inhabitants 
in equilibrium ( 0<∂∂ ii uP ).  
 
Labour markets and centralized wage bargaining 
Regional differences in labour productivity drive regional unemployment differentials. 
Economies of agglomeration are a plausible source of productivity differentials, but as the 
focus of this paper is on interaction of labour and land markets, we do not take up the burden 
of modelling these explicitly.10 Instead, we assume that regions have different endowments of 
capital, and therefore vary in productivity. Capital is not traded between regions. As we will 
analyse a core-periphery model, we assume that the core has a larger endowment of capital. 
Each region specializes in the production of a different good that is traded on world markets.  
Let Ci denote the endowment of capital in region i. Suppose that region 1 is the core, 
and region 2 is the periphery, then C1 > C2. For simplicity, we assume that elasticities of 
substitution between labour and capital are the same in each region. Labour and capital are the 
only inputs in the production process, so input markets for intermediate goods as well as land 
are ignored. Under Cobb-Douglas technology, production equals αα −= 1iii CLQ , where Li 
denotes labour. Equating marginal costs to marginal productivity and normalizing output 
prices to unity, we obtain the factor demands iii wQL α=  and ( ) iii sQC α−= 1 , where si 
denotes the rent to capital. We substitute the demand for labour in the production function to 
obtain iii CwQ ααααα −−−= 11 . In turn, substitution of Qi in the labour demand equation yields 
iii CwL
ααα −−−= 1111 . The level of production and labour demand are thus determined by the 
wage and the regional endowment of capital.  
                                                 
10
 See Helpman (1998), Tabuchi (1998) or Ottaviano et al. (2002) for models with endogenous agglomeration 
economies, where urban cost of living differentials are a source of dispersion. However, these models do not 
consider labour market imperfections and unemployment.  
 8 
An important element of our model is that, instead of clearing labour markets in each 
region, wages are set at the national level (so w1 = w2). Although several union strategies can 
be modelled in our framework, we make the simplifying assumption that the core is dominant 
in wage negotiations. Therefore, wages are set such that markets clear in the core region. As 
labour is less productive in the periphery, the wage is set above market clearing level in this 
region. Assuming that every worker supplies one unit of labour, equating labour demand and 
supply in the core (region 1) yields ( ) αα −= 111 PCw . Substituting this wage in the labour 
demand equation for the periphery (region 2), we obtain 1212 CCPL = . As long as P1 is such 
that labour demand in the periphery does not exceed supply, the unemployment rate in this 
region can then be computed: 
  
1
2
2
1
2 1 C
C
P
P
u −=           (2) 
 
It will be shown that in an interregional equilibrium, the population in region 2 does exceed 
labour demand.  
 
Interregional equilibrium 
The condition for interregional equilibrium is that expected utility in each region is equal. 
Each worker in a region faces the same probability of becoming unemployed, and workers 
choose a region knowing this probability in advance. When choosing their region of 
residence, workers do not face any migration costs, but these costs are prohibitively high 
afterwards. In other words, workers choose a region of residence for their life time. We thus 
rule out situations in which workers enjoy low land prices in the periphery, but move to the 
core immediately after they have become unemployed.11  
 Substituting demand for land and the composite good in the utility function and 
equating expected indirect utility in each region, we obtain the equilibrium condition: 
 
( )( )[ ]bwubrwr −−+= −− 221 1ββ         (3) 
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 Compare for example the regional efficiency wage model in Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), where a similar 
assumption is made.  
 9 
In order to arrive at a simple analytical solution, we assume that the benefit level is zero. 
Substituting the rent equation (1) and the unemployment equation (2) into the equilibrium 
condition (3) yields after some rewriting ( ) β−= 12121 CCPP . The majority of people live in 
the core, where the capital endowment is largest and labour market conditions are the most 
favourable. The implied unemployment rate is ( )β122 1 CCu −= . We verify that labour supply 
in the periphery exceeds demand as C1 > C2. The rent gradient can be expressed in terms of 
the peripheral unemployment rate in the following way: 
 
( ) β12
1
2 1 u
r
r
−=           (4) 
 
Equation 4 shows that regional land rent differentials correlate negatively to unemployment 
differentials, compensating workers for less favourable labour market conditions. It provides 
an economic interpretation for estimates of the relationship between house prices and 
unemployment, which will be presented in a more general framework in Section 4.12  
Finally, note that the condition that wages are the same in each region may be relaxed. 
For instance, let us assume that regional wage rigidities due to bargaining at the national level 
hamper full adjustment to local labour market conditions, without restricting the wage at 
exactly the same level in each region. Unemployment exists in the periphery as long as the 
wage is set above its competitive level, and regional wages and unemployment correlate 
negatively. Hence, in this extension, both a wage curve and regional unemployment 
differentials are observed in equilibrium.  
 
3 Compensation and regional adjustment 
 
Housing markets may play a major role not only in a long-run compensating equilibrium, but 
also in the adjustment process towards such an equilibrium. Relevant properties of housing 
markets that generate compensation are inelastic supply and durability of constructs. Even in 
the absence of any government involvement in housing or related input markets, short-run 
supply of housing is inelastic because of the construction process. Making land suitable for 
                                                 
12
 In order to close the general equilibrium model, we have to discuss ownership of land and capital. Suppose 
that land and capital are owned by a government, which leases these commodities to consumers and producers 
respectively. The rents are used to finance unemployment benefits and excess government income is 
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building, constructing houses and providing the necessary infrastructure are time-consuming 
activities. Moreover, regulations regarding the type and location of housing, as well as the 
involvement of municipalities and local communities, are likely to delay construction 
substantially. Once built, the constructs tend to remain in place for decades, or even centuries. 
Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) present evidence for the US that downward adjustment of the 
housing stock is even more inelastic than supply of new houses because of durability, 
implying that urban decline takes much longer than urban growth.  
 Let us consider a two region model again, where markets are assumed to be in 
equilibrium. Suppose that one of the regions is hit by an adverse labour demand shock. In this 
region, wages will go down, unemployment will rise, and labour will migrate to the other 
region. Durability of housing in the region that experienced the adverse shock implies that 
supply does not adjust to decreased demand, and house prices go down. Moreover, as supply 
of housing in the other region is rigid, house prices will go up there in the short run.13 
Rigidities in housing markets thus create a short-run compensating differential that exceeds 
compensation in a long-run equilibrium, sustaining regional unemployment differentials out 
of equilibrium. 
 Inelastic supply and durability of housing affect aggregate unemployment as well as 
regional unemployment differentials, because labour mobility would reduce any spatial 
mismatch of labour supply and demand. Evidence is provided by Bover et al. (1989), who 
analyse aggregate time series of wages and unemployment in the UK. For both variables, they 
find an upward effect of regional cost-of-living differentials and of housing market 
institutions that hamper mobility. 
 
4 Empirical analysis 
 
Section 2 demonstrates that a plausible set of assumptions may generate equilibrium regional 
unemployment differentials and compensation in housing markets, but we consider the 
derived model too stylized for a direct confrontation with the data. In particular, wages are 
unlikely to be fully fixed by centralized wage bargaining, and there may be compensation in 
amenity differentials. Therefore, we employ a more general framework for estimation of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
redistributed through lump sum transfers. Although closing the model in this way would make the analytical 
solution more cumbersome, the qualitative properties of the model would not be affected. 
13
 Glaeser et al. (2005) show for US metropolitan areas that positive demand shocks translate into either high 
house prices and wages or population growth, depending on the rigidity of housing supply. They find a 
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compensating differential. Maintaining the assumption that equilibrium is achieved through 
worker mobility, it is implied that (expected) utility in each region is the same. In the presence 
of wage and amenity differentials, this no-arbitrage condition (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005) 
can be written in the following manner: 
 



=
++
amenities ,ntunemployme ,wagesf  costs housing
-
     (5) 
 
Equation 5 states that housing costs are higher in locations that offer higher wages, lower 
unemployment rates and more valuable amenities. We may interpret it as a hedonic model for 
land rents, fitting the framework that was essentially set out by Rosen (1979) and Roback 
(1982).14 The coefficient for unemployment reflects the compensating differential in housing 
markets that theory predicts.15 It should be noted that it does not have a causal interpretation, 
because house prices, wages and unemployment are simultaneously determined in a general 
equilibrium. This no-arbitrage condition underpins our empirical specifications, which are 
estimated on city-level data in Section 4.1 and on housing demand survey data in Section 
4.2.16  
 
4.1 European Urban Audit data 
In the Urban Audit (European Commission, 2004), unemployment and average house price 
per square meter are observed for 113 cities in 9 different countries, in the period 1999 - 
2003.17 Appendix 1 contains a table with all the observations. Although our theoretical 
analysis was primarily at the level of regions, an empirical analysis of cities has the advantage 
                                                                                                                                                        
significant impact of local regulation on house prices and wages. In Europe, where land use controls are stronger 
in most countries, these effects are expected to be stronger.  
14
 Blomquist et al. (1988) and Gyourko and Tracy (1989, 1991) and Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) are studies in 
the same tradition.   
15
 In the theoretical analysis, we have assumed that workers choose a region of residence for their life time. 
Forward looking behaviour implies a relationship between house prices and (appropriately discounted) future 
regional unemployment rates or, loosely speaking, the structural unemployment rate. In the empirical analysis, 
we include the current unemployment rate, which can be regarded as a reasonable approximation of the 
structural rate in a cross-sectional analysis. However, measurement error implies that our estimates of 
compensation for structural unemployment are conservative. 
16
 The collection of regional house price data for different countries in Europe, let alone micro economic data 
that allow controlling for housing attributes, has turned out to be a difficult task. Given the relevance of the 
subject for policy, more effort in the collection of such data by national and international organizations would be 
most welcome in our view.  
17
 This dataset is collected by Eurostat, and it contains information on cities in EU member states. Themes 
covered range from demography and socio-economic aspects to environment. Therefore, the choice for 
covariates reflecting amenity differentials is relatively broad.  The data being presented at three different spatial 
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that these are more homogeneous than regions. Moreover, intercity commuting is likely to be 
much smaller than interregional commuting.18 Table 1 shows bivariate relationships between 
house prices and unemployment rates, both in logarithms, for each country separately.  
This analysis provides preliminary evidence of compensation in house prices, 
indicating a negative relationship with unemployment for each country. For 5 out of 9 
countries, including the countries for which we have the most observations, the estimated 
elasticity is between -0.4 and -0.6. Furthermore, an elasticity in this range would not be 
statistically rejected at the 10 percent level for any of the other countries.19 The relationship 
seems sufficiently homogeneous over countries to justify pooling of the data. In a regression 
of house prices on unemployment and country dummies, shown in the first column of Table 2, 
we find an elasticity of -0.48 with a standard error of 0.05. House prices are 5 percent lower 
on average in cities where unemployment is 10 percent up, which is a sizeable effect.  
 
Table 1: Bivariate regressions of house prices on unemployment  
Country coefficient std. error R2 N of obs. 
Denmark  -1.548 0.703 0.708 4 
Finland -0.418 0.073 0.942 4 
Czech republic -0.942 0.157 0.923 5 
Sweden -0.128 0.394 0.034 5 
The Netherlands -0.130 0.172 0.125 6 
France -0.443 0.222 0.285 12 
Spain -0.536 0.284 0.182 18 
UK -0.436 0.138 0.311 24 
Germany -0.532 0.058 0.714 35 
Note: average house price per square meter and unemployment are in logarithms. Data points are so-called core 
cities as defined in European Commission (2004). Countries are put in order of the number of cities observed. 
The raw data are shown in the Appendix 1.  
 
The no-arbitrage condition (5) states that the estimated relationship between house 
prices and unemployment can be interpreted as a compensating differential, once we have 
controlled for wage and amenity differentials. The wage is not observed in the Urban Audit, 
so we include median household income in a multivariate regression instead. Amenities are 
measured through population density, temperature, the average temperature of the warmest 
                                                                                                                                                        
levels, we consider the core city level, which is delineated on the basis of administrative boundaries. We leave 
Estonia out of our sample, since we have only 2 observations for this country.  
18
 Commuting between regions weakens the negative relationship between unemployment and house prices, as 
workers are able to enjoy cheaper housing in one region and more favourable labour market conditions in 
another region. 
19
 The precision of the estimate and the share of variation accounted for varies wildly between countries. The 
standard errors for Germany and Finland are remarkably small and the R2 statistics are large, but in Denmark, 
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month, crime, the number of recorded crimes per 1,000 residents and tourism, the number of 
tourist overnight stays in registered accommodation per year per resident. Population density 
may be regarded as an amenity if people value short-distance social interactions. More 
importantly, we include this variable as it is likely to correlate with unobserved amenities, 
such as a wider choice of theatres, bars and so on. Similarly, tourism is likely to be correlated 
with unobserved amenities.  
 
Table 2: Estimation of the no-arbitrage equation on average city house prices 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 coefficient std. error coefficient std. error coefficient std. error 
unemployment -0.484 0.052 -0.353 0.071 -0.247 0.053 
income 
   0.626 0.192  0.913 0.176 
pop. density 
   0.120 0.011  0.122 0.006 
temperature 
  -0.012 0.038 -0.017 0.031 
crime 
   0.046 0.043 -0.068 0.048 
tourism 
   0.072 0.020  0.074 0.013 
Czech republic -0.883 0.008 -0.783 0.037   
Germany - reference country - 
Denmark  -0.741 0.025 -0.671 0.050   
Spain -0.302 0.025 -0.054 0.080 -0.140 0.076 
Finland -0.172 0.020 -0.477 0.081   
France -0.322 0.020 -0.207 0.027 -0.204 0.034 
The Netherlands -0.586 0.031 -0.739 0.040 -0.709 0.050 
Sweden -0.659 0.020 -0.661 0.049   
UK -0.500 0.015 -0.375 0.032   
constant 
 8.643 0.110  1.115 1.950 -1.381 1.653 
R2 0.681 0.788 0.860 
N. of obs. 113 113 67 
Note: average house price per square meter is the dependent variable, all variables are in logarithms. In Model 2, 
missing values of covariates have been substituted with country means, or sample means if there were less than 
two observations for a country. In Model 3, there is no substitution of missings and observations for the Czech 
republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Sweden and the UK have to be excluded. Reported standard errors are 
robust to heteroskedasticity and correlation within countries. For details on the variables used, see European 
Commission (2004). 
 
Table 2 presents estimates of house prices on these variables, all taken in logarithms. 
Next to the regression without controls that we discussed earlier, two other specifications are 
presented, because the control variables contain a lot of missing observations. In Model 2, 
missings are substituted with country means, or sample means if there were less than two 
observations for a country. Model 3 is estimated on the sample of cities for which we observe 
all controls. For both specifications, statistically significant relationships between house 
                                                                                                                                                        
Sweden and the Netherlands, an elasticity of zero cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level of significance due to 
larger standard errors.  
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prices and unemployment are reported, although controlling for income and amenity 
differentials reduces the estimate somewhat. Furthermore, the difference between the Model 2 
and Model 3 estimates indicates some heterogeneity between countries after including 
controls in the model, in spite of our findings in Table 1.  
Estimated effects of the control variables are consistent with the no-arbitrage 
interpretation of Equation 5, as housing is more expensive in locations that offer higher 
incomes or a more attractive set of amenities. The elasticity to household income is close to 
unity. Of the variables that measure or proxy amenity differentials, only population density 
and tourism appear to have statistically significant effects. Notably, temperature does not 
appear to play any role, although US studies tend to find large effects of climate variables (cf. 
Blomquist et al., 1988).20 As consumer amenities are more likely to capitalize in land than in 
labour markets, this suggests that amenity models, such as estimated for the US by Marston 
(1985), can not account for within-country regional unemployment differentials in Europe.21  
 
4.2 Evidence from a housing demand survey 
Estimates of compensating differentials in housing markets on aggregate data may be biased, 
because heterogeneity of the housing stock is ignored. Houses in low-unemployment regions 
may be more expensive, because the average quality is higher. Presumably, this bias is 
limited, because house prices in our city-level analysis are scaled to area, and because we 
control for income and amenity differentials. However, the point is further examined here, in 
an analysis of quality-controlled house prices. Since these prices may be regarded as land 
rents, the interpretation of Equation 5 as a hedonic land rent model is enhanced.  
 Land rent differentials are estimated by regressing house prices on characteristics and 
region dummies. We perform this hedonic house price analysis on Dutch housing demand 
surveys (WBO’s) for the years 1985 and 2002, which have a sample size of roughly 100,000 
households each. The broad range of housing variables includes space-related attributes such 
the type of house, the number of rooms and availability of a garden, as well as other attributes 
such as year of construction and availability of central heating. In addition, our dataset 
contains labour market related household characteristics, such as age and educational 
                                                 
20
 We have experimented with other climate variables but all appeared to be statistically insignificant.  
21
 Indeed, in a regression of unemployment on amenity variables, we found no significant effect of temperature. 
Moreover, tourism had a negative effect and unemployment and crime appeared to be positively correlated, 
although the amenity model of unemployment would predict reverse signs.    
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attainment of some members as well as wages and household income.22 The regional level 
considered is the European NUTS3 level, which consists of 40 so-called COROP regions.23 
Results for the hedonic house price model are shown in Appendix 2. Bivariate relationships 
between unemployment and both house prices and land rents, controlled for period-specific 
heterogeneity, are presented in Table 3. 
   
Table 3: Bivariate regressions of house prices and land rents on unemployment  
Dependent variable coefficient std. error R2 N of obs. 
Average regional house price -0.244 0.060 0.283 80 
Land rent from hedonic model -0.336 0.072 0.302 80 
Note: all variables are in logarithms. Land rents are obtained by estimating a hedonic house price model that 
includes region dummies, results are shown in Appendix 2. Time dummies are included in these bivariate 
models, and standard errors are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity between regions.  
 
Consistent with our findings for city-level data, Table 3 indicates that both average 
house prices and land rents are about 3 percent lower in regions where unemployment is 10 
percent up. It suggests that ignoring heterogeneity of the housing stock leads to 
underestimation of the relationship between house prices and unemployment, although the 
difference is not statistically significant.  
 
Table 4: Estimation of the no-arbitrage equation on regional house prices and land rents 
Variable  Model 1 (house prices) Model 2 (land rents) 
 coefficient std. error coefficient std. error 
Unemployment -0.156  0.068 -0.158  0.058 
Regional component wages  
 0.629  0.625  0.889  0.522 
Population density 
 0.059  0.033  0.148  0.027 
R2 0.419 0.742 
Number of observations 80 80 
Note: all variables are in logarithms. The regional component of wages is obtained by regressing male hourly 
wages on age and educational attainment (both in 5 classes) as well as region dummies for each period. 
Coefficients of time dummies are included in the regressions, but not reported in the table. Standard errors are 
robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity between regions.  
 
Again, in order to interpret the relationship between land rents and unemployment as a 
compensating differential, we include regional wage and amenity differentials in our analysis. 
                                                 
22
 We supplement these data with regional unemployment data taken from two sources. Unemployment in 2002 
is derived from the labour force survey (EBB) from Statistics Netherlands, and for 1985 we use registered 
unemployment (Sociaal-economische Maandstatistiek, 1985). From a 1985 labour force survey, we have 
regional unemployment data for a higher level of spatial aggregation. At that level, it correlates almost perfectly 
with the registered unemployment data. Also, we use population density from Statistics Netherlands.  
23
 This dataset is less suitable for estimation of the relationship between house prices and unemployment at the 
city level. Ignoring interregional commuting, we would expect to find the same relationship at the regional as at 
 16 
Our dataset allows to control for the regional component to wages rather than average 
household income, which is consistent with an interpretation of the regression model as a no-
arbitrage condition. It is obtained by regressing wages of full-time working males on age, 
educational attainment and period-specific region dummies. Amenity differentials are 
measured by population density. Furthermore, we include period dummies. Table 4 shows 
estimates where the dependent variable is either regional average house prices (Model 1) or 
land rents (Model 2).  
In regressions that include wage and amenity differentials, both house prices and land 
rents appear to be almost 2 percent lower in regions where unemployment is 10 percent up.24 
Therefore, controlling for heterogeneity of the housing stock does not seem to affect our 
estimate of the compensating differential.25 Furthermore, land is more expensive in locations 
that offer higher wages or more attractive amenities, as reflected in a higher population 
density. The coefficients are consistent with our findings for European cities in Table 2. Note 
that these effects are not statistically significant when we regard average house prices instead 
of land rents, and they account for a much smaller share of the variance.26 
The pattern of observed land prices, unemployment and wages in the Netherlands 
seems consistent with the core-periphery model of section 2, with a core consisting of the 
densely populated regions in the west of the country (the Randstad area). Estimation of a 
standard wage curve equation on our data yields an elasticity of -0.06, which is significantly 
smaller than the -0.10 coefficient of Blanchflower and Oswald (1994). Hence, rigidities due to 
centralized wage bargaining seem to play a role. Higher wages in the Randstad plausibly 
reflect a productivity advantage due to economies of agglomeration. As predicted by our 
model, land prices in this area are above, and unemployment is below the national average.  
                                                                                                                                                        
the city level, since micro data allow to control for urban-rural heterogeneity of the housing stock to a large 
extent.  
24
 Consistent with our findings in Table 1, the estimated compensating differential is somewhat smaller in the 
Netherlands than in other European countries. Commuting between the COROP regions, which averages about 
20 percent of the working labour force, may account for this difference. We have included a spatial lag of 
unemployment in the regression (the average of unemployment in neighbouring regions), but this variable was 
not statistically significant.  
25
 Replacing the regional component to wages by average household income, we obtained a similar result.  
26
 Estimates of the compensating differential for 1985 and 2002 separately do not deviate from the estimates in 
Table 4 in a statistically significant way. Observing unemployment and house prices for two periods, it is 
possible to include regional fixed effects in the hedonic land rent model. However, it is the structural component 
to regional unemployment differentials that is compensated in housing markets, and changes of unemployment 
over time are likely to capture this component less well than levels do. Moreover, the variation over time is too 
limited to enable identification. The correlation coefficient of the logarithm of unemployment in 1985 and 2002 
is 0.50, for wages it is 0.70 and for household income it is 0.62. Nevertheless, changes of unemployment over 
the period 1985 - 2002 correlate negatively to changes in land prices, although this relationship is not statistically 
significant.  
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 An important point we take from our analysis of housing demand survey data is that 
analyses using aggregate house price data are unlikely to overestimate the compensating 
differential. This indicates that conclusions from our analysis of the Urban Audit data, which 
draw on variation in house prices and unemployment rates for several countries, are not 
critically flawed because of omission of housing quality characteristics.  
 
5 Conclusions and policy implications 
 
This paper has provided empirical evidence for compensation of regional unemployment 
differentials in housing markets. Employing an extensive dataset on European cities, an 
elasticity ranging from -0.6 to -0.4 could not be rejected for any of the 9 countries observed. 
Including city-level income and amenity variables in a regression that was interpreted as a no-
arbitrage condition, a somewhat smaller compensating differential was found. An analysis of 
housing demand surveys for the Netherlands indicated that these findings are robust to 
omission of house attributes.  
 Do these estimates imply full compensation of regional unemployment? We address 
this question by comparing the income effect of an increase in regional unemployment to the 
income effect of an associated decrease in house prices.27 Suppose that workers spend about a 
third of their income on housing, and that benefits amount to 70 percent of wages. If there is 
no wage curve, then with an elasticity of -0.3, compensation in house prices exceeds the 
income loss due to increased probability of unemployment by far.28 However, the two effects 
come remarkably close to cancelling out when we assume a wage curve elasticity of -0.10.29 
The sizable compensating differential indicated by our empirical results thus strongly suggests 
that high regional unemployment rates proxy less favourable labour market conditions, which 
may also result in lower wages.30 Hence, we regard it as indirect evidence of the wage curve.  
                                                 
27
 This is obviously a rather rough evaluation of compensation, which ignores any substitution effects, as well as 
compensating differentials in other markets, in particular for nontradables, that are likely to correlate to the price 
differential in housing markets. Heterogeneity of the labour force is not accounted for either. Compensation in 
housing markets may not accrue to the unemployed in particular, nor to groups that are most vulnerable to 
unemployment. On the contrary, as these groups are likely to be overrepresented in the highly regulated rental 
market, they may find it more difficult to benefit from lower house prices. We do not consider the rental market 
explicitly in this paper, but further research on this topic would be most welcome in our view. 
28
 If unemployment is 5 percent, then the income effect due to lower house prices is roughly about a factor 10 
higher than the expected income loss due an to increased probability of unemployment.  
29
 Note that for the Netherlands, we found a smaller elasticity of both house prices and wages to regional 
unemployment. Therefore, the two income effects come close to cancelling out for this country as well.  
30
 It is common practice to regard the unemployment rate as a macro-economic indicator. In a similar vein, the 
regional unemployment rate indicates regional economic conditions. It may be correlated with wages, but also 
with the quality of matches and other labour market variables. The evidence thus suggests that housing markets 
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Existence of a compensating differential in housing markets has a number of 
implications for policy. Currently, the European Union and many of its member countries 
spend billions of euros on regional support programs, which are motivated at least partly by 
equity considerations. Our evidence suggests that equity may be less of an issue, as people in 
backward regions receive compensation already. Expected utility may therefore be the same 
in each region, and if so, regional support programs should be justified rather on efficiency 
grounds. Our analysis may also help to understand why regional unemployment differentials 
have remained so persistent, in spite of these generous support programs.  
Compensation in housing markets has implications for labour market policies as well. 
In a theoretical model, we have shown that regional unemployment differentials may result 
from centralized wage bargaining. Therefore, the recommendation of OECD (2000, 2005) and 
European Commission (2003) to relax the regional wage rigidities associated with these 
institutions applies in the framework of our model. Moreover, in most European countries 
unemployment benefit levels are also set at the national level. Compensation then implies a 
regional differential in real benefit levels. The desirability of such a differential is 
questionable from the perspective of equity. Also, it may reduce the incentive to job search 
for people in high-unemployment regions more than in other regions. Hence, there would be a 
case for adjustment of unemployment benefit levels to regional cost-of-living differentials.  
A third area of policy we touch upon refers to housing markets and spatial planning. 
As we have argued in section 3, housing markets may play a major role in regional adjustment 
processes, because of inelastic supply and durability of housing. These properties of the good 
are not necessarily related to regulations. However, in many European countries, 
governments, municipalities and other local bodies have a major say in what type of housing 
should be constructed and where it should be built. This public involvement is generally 
thought to delay and restrict housing supply, and therefore increases the compensating 
differential. In turn, regional adjustment of labour supply and clearing of aggregate labour 
markets is hampered (cf. Bover et al., 1989). Furthermore, the supply of land for habitation or 
production is restricted by spatial planning and land use controls. Therefore, these policies 
may also increase regional differentials in house prices and unemployment in equilibrium. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
compensate for regional labour market conditions, rather than for the loss in expected income due to 
unemployment only. As wages and unemployment do not correlate perfectly, both are informative on these 
conditions. Consequently, the positive relationship between house prices and the regional component to wages, 
or average household income, may also be interpreted as compensation for regional labour market conditions.  
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Appendix 1: City-level house prices and unemployment rates  
city house 
price 
unemp. city house 
price 
unemp. city  house 
price 
unemp. 
Czech republic   Erfurt 1432 15.1 Rotterdam 1423 5.9 
Praha 1563 5.4 Augsburg 2270 5.5 Utrecht 1364 3.0 
Brno 781 9.1 Bonn 2127 4.5 Groningen 1384 6.4 
Ostrava 469 17.3 Karlsruhe 2454 5.3 Arnhem 1410 5.9 
Plzen 781 8.1 Mönchengladbach 2250 7.2 Finland   
Usti nad Labem 625 13.5 Mainz 2618 5.2 Helsinki 1943 5.8 
Denmark   Spain   Tampere 1307 16.0 
København 1546 4.5 Madrid 1855 12.4 Turku 1316 16.3 
Aarhus 1321 5.2 Barcelona 2500 10.8 Oulu 1181 15.9 
Odense 1039 5.2 Valencia 874 14.2 Sweden   
Aalborg 1052 5.8 Sevilla 1028 22.8 Stockholm 2064 3.3 
Germany   Zaragoza 1102 11.8 Göteborg 1409 5.6 
Berlin 1759 14.9 Málaga 965 21.0 Malmö  1468 9.1 
Hamburg 2250 7.6 Murcia 698 11.5 Jönköping 791 3.4 
München 3784 3.6 Las Palmas 1222 19.9 Umeå 935 11.0 
Köln 2454 7.3 Valladolid 1172 14.6 United 
Kingdom 
  
Frankfurt am 
Main 
3150 5.4 Palma di Mallorca 1381 12.0 London 2904 6.5 
Essen 2495 7.7 Santiago de 
Compostela 
1055 12.2 Birmingham 1318 9.5 
Leipzig 1473 17.4 Vitoria/Gasteiz 1744 9.9 Leeds 1336 5.1 
Dresden 1677 14.7 Oviedo 1180 14.1 Glasgow 1321 10.8 
Dortmund 2413 9.6 Pamplona/Iruňa 1655 10.7 Bradford 1042 6.9 
Düsseldorf 2577 6.3 Santander 1319 15.7 Liverpool 992 11.1 
Bremen 1452 8.3 Toledo 889 10.8 Edinburgh  2014 5.2 
Hannover 1595 9.4 Badajoz 661 20.9 Manchester 1307 9.0 
Nürnberg 2413 7.6 Logroňo 1180 10.6 Cardiff 1489 4.9 
Bochum 2372 7.8 France   Sheffield 1136 6.7 
Wuppertal 2004 6.5 Lyon 1400 11.5 Bristol 1533 4.6 
Bielefeld 1841 7.8 Bordeaux 1200 14.3 Belfast 1361 9.6 
Halle an der 
Saale 
1104 20.8 Nantes 1200 13.2 Newcastle 
upon Tyne 
1189 8.0 
Magdeburg 1432 19.0 Lille 1200 14.4 Leicester 1084 7.9 
Wiesbaden 3477 6.0 Saint-Etienne 1000 13.5 Derry 951 12.0 
Göttingen 1800 10.0 Le Havre 1000 17.1 Aberdeen 1408 5.0 
Mülheim 
a.d.Ruhr 
1963 6.1 Rennes 1400 9.0 Cambridge 2536 3.8 
Moers 2045 6.6 Nancy 1000 11.1 Exeter 1553 3.9 
Darmstadt 2556 5.3 Orléans 1400 8.7 Lincoln 1016 6.4 
Trier 1841 7.6 Dijon 1400 10.7 Gravesham 1937 5.2 
Freiburg im 
Breisgau 
2700 6.0 Grenoble 1600 13.2 Stevenage 1762 4.0 
Regensburg 2104 6.3 Ajaccio 1000 14.2 Wrexham 1179 5.1 
Frankfurt (Oder) 1340 18.9 The Netherlands   Portsmouth 1571 4.6 
Weimar 1432 14.7 s' Gravenhage 1714 3.4 Worcester 1549 3.8 
Schwerin 1227 15.8 Amsterdam 1781 4.3    
Note: these data are obtained from the Urban Audit (European Commission, 2004). The spatial level considered 
is the core city, which is delineated on the basis of administrative boundaries. House prices refer to the average 
house price in euros per square meter. These data refer to the period 1999 - 2003 (so not to the same year for 
each country).  
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Appendix 2: Hedonic house price analysis (used to obtain land rents) 
Variable coefficient standard error 
Dwelling type (reference is apartment) 
  
     free standing 
 0.478 0.047 
     semi-detached (1985) 
 0.209 0.051 
     semi-detached (2002) 
 0.190 0.053 
     corner house 
 0.066 0.051 
     terraced house  -0.018 0.051 
Number of rooms (reference is 1) 
  
    2 
 0.070 0.089 
    3 
 0.233 0.092 
    4 
 0.358 0.092 
    5 
 0.446 0.091 
    6 
 0.546 0.089 
    7 or more 
 0.690 0.092 
Garden 
 0.152 0.024 
Size living room exceeds 30 m2 
 0.165 0.005 
Size kitchen exceeds 8 m2 (1985) 
 0.050 0.008 
Size kitchen exceeds 8 m2 (2002) 
 0.104 0.006 
Central heating (1985) 
 0.235 0.011 
Central heating (2002) 
 0.158 0.015 
Double-glazing in living room 
 0.023 0.010 
Double-glazing in rest of the house (1985) 
 0.067 0.007 
Double-glazing in rest of the house (2002) 
 0.037 0.008 
Balcony (no ground floor apartment) 
 0.090 0.009 
Elevator (no ground floor apartment) 
 0.103 0.054 
Period of construction (reference is before 1945) 
  
     1945 - 1959 -0.046 0.011 
     1960 - 1969 (1985) 
 0.030 0.011 
     1960 - 1969 (2002) -0.104 0.017 
     1970 - 1979 (1985) 
 0.087 0.011 
     1970 - 1979 (2002) -0.049 0.015 
     after 1979 (1985) 
 0.094 0.018 
     1980 - 1989 (2002) -0.031 0.014 
     after 1989 (2002) 
 0.077 0.015 
Dummy 2002 
 1.399 0.025 
Constant 10.061 0.110 
Region dummies 1985 (40) included 
Region dummies 2002 (40) included 
R2 0.794 
Number of observations 49,459 
Note: hedonic regression of house prices in logarithms on characteristics and period-specific region dummies, 
estimated on Dutch housing demand survey data (WBO) for 1985 and 2002. We have estimated two 
specifications of this model. In one specification, all coefficients were period-specific. In the second 
specification, which is reported here, only statistically significant variation of coefficients over time was allowed 
for. For these variables, the year between brackets indicate the period to which the effect refers. Reported 
standard errors are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity at the regional level. Coefficients for period-
specific dummies are used as estimates of regional land rent differentials in the paper.  
